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The Jewish Lawyer's Question*
by Russell G. PearceThe Baal Shem' handed [the Maggid of Mezeritch] the Book of splendor,
the Zohar: "Can you read?"-"Yes."-"Well then, read!"
The
Maggid obeyed. "That is not the way one reads," the Baal Shem
interrupted. "I can see you know how to decipher the signs, but your
knowledge lacks soul." 2
Introduction
Martin Buber describes the question of how to "affirmf]" our Jewish
identity in the modem world as "the personal Jewish question, the root of
all Jewish questions, the question we must discover within ourselves, clarify
within ourselves, and decide within ourselves." 3 This essay raises the

"Jewish question" for lawyers. First, it explores some reasons why Jewish
lawyers answer the question by separating their professional selves from
their religious selves. Second, it observes that such an answer is contrary
to the perspective-rooted in tradition but also common to the otherwise
dissonant streams of Judaism today-that one's Judaism enters every
moment of your life. Last, the essay suggests that this perspective

encourages Jewish lawyers, somewhat incongruously, to reject the
established professional attitude toward role, while at the same time to

pursue substantive values compatible with those of our legal system.

*

MARTIN BUBER, ON JUDAISM 19 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1967) (referring to the "personal

Jewish question").
** Jewish. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1978, J.D.
1981, Yale University. I would like to thank the following persons for their valuable comments on this
essay: Naomi Cahn, Mary Daly, David Dow, Jill Fisch, Bruce Green, Martin Hertz, Tracy Higgins,
Michele Hirshman, Jim Kainen, Sam Levine, Uncas McThenia, Bob Reber, Arthur Gross Schaefer,
Evely Laser Shlensky, and Burt Visotzky. I am especially grateful for the contributions of my research
assistants Deborah Lichtenstein, Larry Metz, and Jennifer Nierenberg.
1. The "Baal Shem" refers to Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov, the founder of the Hasidic
movement in Judaism. See ELIE WIESEL, SOULS ON FIRE 3-39 (Marion Wiesel trans., 1972); see also
LOUIS JACOBS, HASIDIC PRAYER 1-16 (1993). The phrase "Baal Shem Tov" literally means "Master
of the Good Name." WIESEL, supra, at 3.
2. WIESEL, supra note 1, at 55.
3. MARTIN BUBER, ON JUDAISM 19 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1967) (referring to the "personal
Jewish question").
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I. THE APPEAL OF PROFESSIONAL VALUES LARGELY SEPARATE FROM
JEWISH IDENTITY

As a lawyer and a teacher of lawyers and law students, my experience
has been that Jewish lawyers are even more uncomfortable than Christian
lawyers with the possibility that their legal practice might have a religious
dimension. Last Spring, for example, I had the opportunity to help lead an
Auburn Theological Seminary program for Jewish and Christian lawyers on
the role of religion in a lawyer's work. At the first session, the lawyers
received text sources and heard talks from a leading Christian theologian
and a prominent Rabbi on religious perspectives on professional role. I
then separated the lawyers into a Christian group and a Jewish group and
asked them to construct a religious concept of the lawyer's professional
role. The Christian lawyers debated whether the concepts of vocation and
calling applied to their work. Despite explicit guidance from the Rabbinic
speaker, the Jewish lawyers ignored the religious implications of their
practice. Instead, they focused on how their minority status and the
resulting experience of discrimination influenced their approach to
lawyering, including their commitment to rule of law and social justice.
A similar, but less stark, contrast exists within mainstream legal
scholarship on Jewish lawyering. What it means to be a religious lawyer
has been the exclusive focus of commentators examining what it means to
be a Christian lawyer, such as Joseph Allegretti4 and Thomas Shaffer.5
In contrast, commentators examining what it means to be a Jewish lawyer,
such as Sanford Levinson,6 Jerome Hornblass, 7 and myself,' are much
more likely to include nonreligious considerations when examining what it
means to be a Jewish lawyer. All three acknowledge an ethnically Jewish
perspective. Both Levinson and I suggest the possibility of a Jewish lawyer
having an ethnically Jewish identity related tangentially, if at all, to
religious identification. Levinson further considers the possibility of Jewish
identity as only a "demographic measure.' '
When I began to reflect on these differences, I realized that I too for
many years had avoided confronting the consequence of my religious belief
for my legal work. As a law clerk, associate at a Wall Street firm, legal

4.

Joseph Allegretti, Christ and the Code: The Dilemma of the ChristianAttorney, 34 CATH.

LAW. 131 (1988).
5. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT

(1981).
6.

Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer. Reflections on the Construction of

ProfessionalIdentity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577 (1993).
7. Jerome Homblass, The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZo L. REV. 1639 (1993).

8. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a MulticulturalSociety: A Midrash on Levinson, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1613 (1993).
9. Levinson, supra note 6, at 1587.
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services lawyer, and general counsel to a governmental civil rights agency,
I had only a vague sense of the connection between my Judaism, my pro
bono and public interest choices, my integrity, and my treatment of coworkers and adversaries. Despite my belief that Judaism entered all areas
of my life, I did not begin to think systematically or in depth about the
implications of Judaism for law practice until I became a law professor and
I read Joseph Allegretti's and Thomas Shaffer's scholarship on Christian
lawyering. 10
Although a major reason for this distinction is the very existence of a
readily perceived Jewish, and not a Christian, ethnic identity," I suspect
that this factor is only part of a complex set of reasons why Jewish lawyers
find appealing a concept of professional role which excludes or drastically
limits the influence of religious identity on professional conduct. These
include minority status, a history of discrimination, and the existence of
modern Jewish religious and ethnic perspectives which would interfere
little, if at all, with professional obligations.
A. The ProfessionalProject'sLiberatingAppeal to a Religious Minority
Religious identification is problematic for all lawyers as a result of the
"professional project," or the process of creating and maintaining
professional role. Sanford Levinson has described how the "professional
project [of law]

. .

. 'bleach[es] out' . . . merely contingent aspects of the

self, including the residue of particularistic socialization that we refer to as
our 'conscience."" ' . As I have noted elsewhere, "[riule of law implies
that the quality of lawyering and of justice an individual receives does not
depend on the group identity of the lawyer or judge."'" Lawyers are to
take a neutral approach to their work, free of external group identifications,
including their religion. 4 Under the professional project, lawyers are
fungible. 5 No distinction exists among Christian, Jewish, Moslem,
Hindu, and Buddhist lawyers who are not to permit their religion to intrude
on their professional role. Indeed, injecting religion into the lawyer's work
contravenes the professional project. Professionalism suggests that
"Jewishness play[] no role"' 6 in a lawyer's work.
The professional project's promise of neutrality affords Jews great
comfort because of our minority status and history of discrimination. We

0,

See supra notes 4-5.

11, Pearce, supra note 8, at 1630 n.115.
12. Levinson, supra note 6, at 1578.
13. Pearce, supra note 8, at 1629.
14. Id. at 1628-29.
15. Levinson, supra note 6, at 1579.
16. Id. at 1594.
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are 2.5% of the United States population.1 7 In a legal system where the
participants acted on their personal affiliations, rather than their duty to the
legal system, we would be losers. We would only obtain justice at the
majority's sufferance, not as a matter of right.
Equally important to Jewish lawyers is the professional project's
promise of equal treatment to all individual lawyers. During the twentieth
century, leaders of the bar and members of the public have stereotyped
Jewish lawyers as " 'overly aggressive hired guns,' "8 adopting unethical
4'gutter' " tactics,' 9 lacking in character,' and " 'Oriental in [their]

fidelity to the minutiae of the subject without regard to any controlling rule
or reason.' "I2 Extensive hiring discrimination against Jewish lawyers
was documented as late as the 1960s' and stereotypes of Jewish lawyers,
both positive and negative, persist today.'
While stereotypes and discrimination have coexisted with the
professional project, the project offers as an ideal a vision of a profession
where individuals are judged solely on their merits, not by virtue of their
group identification. The project promised to liberate us from stereotypes
and discrimination. Indeed, today, despite the persistence of some
stereotypes, this promise seems to have been largely realized. The number
of Jewish lawyers significantly exceeds our percentage of the population and
many Jewish lawyers are among the profession's elite.24 Jerold S.
Auerbach, the historian who has most thoroughly documented the history
of anti-semitism in the legal profession, recently noted "the astonishing
success story of Jewish lawyers, as they erased the stigma of professional
ostracism ....,

Auerbach suggests yet another explanation for the attachment of Jewish
lawyers to the ideas embodied in the professional project. He suggests that
"[e]specially for Jews, American law offered enticing rewards, beyond
financial security and professional status."'
For immigrant Jews, the

17. Pearce, supra note 8,at 1635.
18. Levinson, supra note 6, at 1588 (quoting Robert E. Roser, Jews and Corporate Legal
Practice 13 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)); see also JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 50 (1976).

19. AUERBACH, supra note 18, at 127 (quoting Henry S. Drinker, the leading legal ethicist of
mid-twentieth century, describing 'Russian Jew boys').
20. Id. at 121-27.
21. ld.at 107. The author of this multiply objectionable statement is ChiefJustice Harlan Stone.
22. See generally Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs-DiscriminatoryEffects in
Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L.J. 625 (1964).
23. Levinson, supra note 6,at 1588.
24.

CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, A CERTAIN PEOPLE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THEIR LIVES TODAY

96-97 (1985).
25.

JEROLD S. AUERBACH,

CONSTrTUTION ix (1990).
26. Id. at xix.

RABBIS AND

LAWYERS:

THE JOURNEY

FROM TORAH TO
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practice of law was the ultimate opportunity for assimilation as an
American. In some sense, lawyers were the definitive "good Americans. "27 They "interpret the traditions and explicate the rules of American society," and serve as the "respected custodians of American
culture.'"I Auerbach further asserts that in service of assimilation Jewish
lawyers "replaced ...

their own sacred-law tradition ...

with the rule of

American law." 29
Each of these perspectives may help explain why on some levels the
professional project and its promise of a nonreligious role morality offers
attractions to Jewish lawyers beyond those offered majority Christian
lawyers.
B. The Availability of Jewish Identities Compatible with
ProfessionalRole
Complementing the appeal of the professional project is the ready
availability of Jewish identities that interfere little, if at all, with professional
role. They offer the Jewish lawyer the opportunity to identify as both a
Jew and a good professional.
Although the absolutist version of the professional project excludes all
extra-professional identifications, a more nuanced version permits
commitments which do not interfere significantly with the substantive
obligations of professional role. Sanford Levinson's use of the example of
Sandy Koufax's refusal to pitch in the World Series on Yom Kippur is
instructive on this point. If the influence of Koufax's religion was limited
to when he pitched and not how he pitched, it only interfered with his
professional role to a limited extent.' A pitcher who does not pitch on
one day when the interests of his team would otherwise require it breaches
his professional obligations, but far less so than if his religion required him
to depart from professional norms on a day-to-day basis.
A Jewish lawyer could similarly be Jewish in ways which would not
disturb the core of professionalism. One way is nonreligious. In part, this
could stem from Jewishness as an ethnic, rather than religious, identification. Louis Brandeis chose to advocate on behalf of Jewish communal
interests and economic justice, and Jack Greenberg to advocate for the

27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. Id. Auerbach argues that leading Jewish lawyers, such as Louis Brandeis, Louis Marshall,
and Felix Frankfurter, created an American Jewish culture that, in a corruption of Jewish tradition,
equated American values with Judaism. Id. at xviii-xix. While Auerbach offers a wealth of valuable
and original insights, his passionate commitment to his view as the only truly Jewish one unfortunately

leads him to caricature those with different views.
30.

Levinson, supra note 6, at 1582-83.
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rights of African-Americans, from commitments derived from a desire not
only to end the oppression of Jews but to realize a world where equal
justice was available to all." The Jewish lawyers at the Auburn Theological Seminary program I described above similarly attributed the commitment of Jewish lawyers to rule of law and equal justice to their experience
of discrimination and not to their religious beliefs.
These ethnic Jewish identifications may influence the causes Jewish
lawyers adopt, but do not otherwise influence how a lawyer engages in
practice. Ethnicity could of course have broader implications, much the
same way some commentators have suggested a feminist style of lawyering.33 But excluding stereotypes, the only ethnically Jewish approaches
to lawyering thus far suggested have been the limited ones described here.
A parallel variety of Jewish religious approaches to lawyering similarly
interfere minimally with the professional project. While Helen Neuborne
and Joseph Rauh join Brandeis and Greenberg in viewing their lawyering
for social justice as the product of their Jewishness, Neuborne and Rauh
recognize the Jewish religious content of their commitment.' As with
Jewish ethnicity, the choice of causes on religious grounds would not
interfere with how one practiced law. A similarly limited conception of
religious lawyering would involve observing Jewish holy days or other
ritual, like Sandy Koufax, "[blut [1]eav[ing] the [i]nternal [n]orms of [1]egal
[p]ractice [u]ntouched." 35
C. Religious Influences Facilitatingthe ProfessionalProject
The absence of express religious authority on the lawyer's role and the
presence of religious perspectives compatible with the project also facilitate
the Jewish lawyer's adherence to the professional project.
While Judaism does have a tradition of great judges who have a duty
to develop a full and fair record, it lacks a developed or formal ethic for the
specific role of a lawyer.16 Parties generally represented themselves
before a Jewish court." Levinson observes that the opposition of the great

31. Pearce, supra note 8, at 1618, 1622.
32. See supra p. 2.
33. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); see also Pearce, supra note 8, at
1626, 1631.
34. Pearce, supra note 8,at 1619-20.
35. Levinson, supra note 6, at 1594.
36.

BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME: SOURCES AND

COMMENTARY 99 (1984); Levinson, supra note 6, at 1597.
37. Dov I. Frimer, The Role ofthe Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J. L. & REL. 297, 301-03 (1983);
Levinson, supra note 6, at 1598.
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medieval Jewish scholar Maimonides to the practice of law resulted from
his view that a lawyer was "a legal manipulator-an artful 'arranger'-concerned less with absolute fidelity to the law than with crafting ostensibly
legal arguments that would enable the client to prevail against an adversary." 38 A seventeenth century rabbi similarly condemned lawyers for
" 'leading to argumentation and strife, deception and the adoption of false
argumentation to justify the wicked and defame the righteous.' ,39
Although Jewish courts have permitted lawyers since the middle ages, only
in 1960 did the Israeli rabbinate "formally accept[] 'practices permitting
legal counsel to argue on behalf of either litigant ......

"I

The Jewish tradition's general hostility to an adversarial role appears
to have an ironic result. The tradition offers little specific guidance for the
modem lawyer who practices in an adversarial system. Absent a developed
or formal code of Jewish legal ethics, a Jewish lawyer may therefore adopt
the values of the professional project without confronting any contrary
religious authority directly on point to the lawyer's role.
At the same time, two common modem versions of Judaism facilitate
observance of the professional project. One version separates the public
from the religious. Martin Buber describes how "[m]odern thinking"
results in versions of religion where "one participates in religious services
without hearing the message commanding him to go out into the world."
One manifestation of this trend in Judaism has been "the development of
a pure ritualism" which accepts "observance of certain prescribed forms"
as the fulfillment of the covenant.42 The modem versions of Judaism
which emphasize "pure ritualism" or other forms which reject the
command "to go out into the world" permit the Jewish lawyer to subscribe
to the professional project or some limited religiosity compatible with the
project.
Another very different version of Judaism identifies the religious with
the public. This version involves going "out into the world," but in so
doing identifies American values, including the professional project, as
being identical with Jewish values. Jerold Auerbach argues that as leaders
of the American Jewish community, lawyers such as Louis Brandeis, Felix
Frankfurter, and Louis Marshall helped create a "synthesis of Judaism and
Americanism.

"'I

This synthesis "identifi[ed] Judaism with Americanism,

38.

Levinson, supra note 6, at 1598-99.

39.

Id. at 1599.

40.
41
42.
43.

Id. at 1600.
BUBER, supra note 3, at 112.
Id. at 129.
Auerbach, supra note 25, at xviii.
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within a common tradition that emphasized the rule of law and the quest for
social justice. "I
II. JUDAISM DEMANDS A PLACE IN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

In his essay The Holy Way: A Word to the Jews and to the Nations,'
Martin Buber declares the "[miodem thinking" embodied in professionalism's separation of the religious self from the professional self to be
"totally un-Jewish." 6 In contrast to the professional ideal, "[t]he world
of true Judaism is the world of a unified life on earth." 47 Buber observes
that "[m]an can do justice to the relation to God that has been given to him
only by actualizing God in the world in accordance with his ability and the
measure of each day, daily."' The separation of work from religion, like
[from] holiness by grace," is
the separation of "holiness-through-works
49
"alien" to Judaism.
In this regard, Buber's observation has roots in traditional Jewish
thinking. Godly actions have been a necessary part of being a religious
Jew. The portion of the Torah called The Life of Holiness' enjoins Jews
to be holy as God is holy,5" and requires, among other things, that you
leave "the gleanings of your harvest ...

for the poor and the stranger,"52

"[l]ove your neighbor as yourself," 53 and treat "[tihe stranger who

resides with you

. . .

as one of your citizens."'

Similarly, the prophets

remind us that faith and prayer alone are not sufficient service to God. The
Prophet Isaiah, for example, told the people that God would not listen to
their prayers until they began to "[d]evote yourselves to justice; [a]id the
wronged[;] uphold the rights of the orphan; [and d]efend the cause of the
widow." 55
The understanding of Judaism as a way of life is common to the
diverse strains of modem Jewish thought. According to eminent Reform
Jewish theologian Rabbi Leo Baeck, a Jew "directs him[- or her-] self
toward God in such a way that no part of his [or her] life is without this

44.

Id. at 17.

45.

BUBER, supra note 3, at 108-48.

46. Id. at 112.
47. Id.
48. MARTiN BuBER, I AND THOU 163 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1970).
49. BUBER, supra note 3, at I11.
50. W. GUNTHER PLAUT Er AL., THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 889-900 (1981) (with
Haftarot) (commenting on Leviticus 19:1-37). Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations to
the Bible are to this version.
51. Leviticus 19:2.
52. Leviticus 19:9-10.
53. Leviticus 19:18.
54. Leviticus 19:34.
55. Isaiah 1:15-17.
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center, without this contact." 6 The great Conservative theologian Rabbi
Abraham Joshua Heschel similarly taught that "[t]he meaning of redemption is to reveal the holy that is concealed, to disclose the divine that is
suppressed. Every [person] is called upon to be a redeemer, and redempThe eminent Orthodox
tion takes place every moment, every day." '
scholar Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik also instructed that the Halakhah
"penetrates into every nook and cranny of life. The marketplace, the
street, the factory, the house, the meeting place, the banquet hall, all
constitute the backdrop for the religious life."" 8
Jewish tradition therefore contains the framework for a version of
Jewish lawyering radically different in premise from that underlying the
professional project.
Ill. ANSWERING THE JEWISH QUESTION

Within the Jewish community, I take an expressly pluralist perspective.
As a Reform Jew, I respect "the right of individual Jews to make the final
decision as to what constitutes Jewish belief and practice for them." 59 In
that spirit, and following the teaching that Judaism is a way of life, I offer
my own answer-in-progress to the Jewish question. The answer is at once
both directly contrary to, and substantially compatible with, the prevailing
conception of the lawyer's role.
In the epigram to this essay, the Baal Shem Toy reproaches his student
the Maggid of Mezeritch for reading without "soul." If one can read with
soul, one can surely lawyer with "soul." As Abraham Joshua Heschel
taught, "[i]t is not enough to do the mitzvah; one must live what he does.
. . . When the soul is dull, the mitzvah is a shell.'"I Heschel describes
It is
the integration of soul into act as Kawanah, "direction to God ....

the act of bringing together the scattered forces of the self; the participation
of heart and soul, not only of will and mind.''61 Interestingly, Heschel
expressly calls for us to bring God into the legal system. He writes that

56.

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, Sermon on the Installation of Rabbi Sharon Kleinbaum at

Congregation Beth Simchat Torah 9 (Sept. 11, 1992) (quoting Rabbi Leo Baeck).
57. ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, BETWEEN GOD AND MAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF JUDAISM 80
(Fritz A. Rothschild ed., 1959).
58. RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLovErrcHiK, HALAKHIC MAN 94 (1983).
59. 2 EUGENE B. BOROWITZ, REFORM JUDAISM TODAY: WHAT WE BELIEVE 13-14 (1977).

This is not just a modem idea. Rabbi Burton L. Visotzky describes "[a]n early midrash on the Book
of Exodus, commenting on the revelation at Mount Sinai, [which] suggests that when God's voice was
heard by the six hundred thousand Israelites, each person heard God differently, in a voice appropriate
to that person's needs." BURTON L. VISOTZKY, READING THE BOOK: MAKING THE BIBLE A TIMELESS
TEXT 13 (1991).
60. HESCHEL, supra note 57, at 165-66.
61. HESCHEL, supra note 57, at 166.
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"God will return to us when we shall be willing to let Him [into all parts
of our lives, including] into our courts. "62
Such a kavvanah of lawyering demands a rejection of the professional
project's separation of the professional from the religious self. As a Jewish
lawyer, I would direct my heart toward God in every moment of my legal
practice. This task requires study and prayer, but it also requires conduct.
As Rabbi Leib, son of Sarah, taught, a Jewish lawyer (like all Jews)
"should see to it that all his [or her] actions are a Torah. "63
But how exactly to fulfill this goal is far from clear. As discussed
above, this lack of clarity results in part from Jewish tradition's hostility to
a lawyer's zealous representation of a client. As a result, those who try to
derive a Jewish ethic for a modem lawyer have to look beyond legal ethics
to construct explanations of why adversarial legal conduct is appropriate.
For example, in two of the few articles discussing Jewish approaches to
legal ethics, Rabbis Alfred Cohen 64 and Gordon Tucker65 examined the
extent of a professional's duty of confidentiality when a client poses threat
of harm to a nonclient. Both applied the principle that halakhah requires
putting the interests of the community above that of the individual. In the
application of this principle to the problem of confidentiality, their analysis
diverged. Rabbi Tucker argued that the good of the community requires
revealing confidences to protect a nonclient from physical or financial harm
In contrast,
even though the individual client will suffer detriment.'
asserted
Cohen
while advising consultation with halakhic authority, Rabbi
that "[i]t may be that maintaining professional secrecy is so absolutely
integral to the proper function of that profession and the profession so
essential to the welfare of society that the halacha would decide that the
practitioner must maintain his professional secrets." 7
In legal ethics, therefore, as in many modem moral questions, the
Jewish response is not self-evident.' For the Jewish lawyer, legal ethics
becomes a subject for Jewish study and reflection. But while recognizing
the vital importance of further study, we can find in our tradition foundational principles that on their face not only harmonize with, but require
dedication to, the best aspirations of our legal system. Recognizing the risk

62. HEscHEL, supra note 57, at 166.
63. MARTIN BUBER, TALES OF THE HASIDIM: THE EARLY MASTERS 169 (Olga Marx trans.,
1947).
64. Alfred S.Cohen, On Maintaininga ProfessionalConfidence, 7 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP.
Soc'Y 84 (1984).
65. Gordon Tucker, The Confidentiality Rule: A PhilosophicalPerspective with Reference to
Jewish Law and Ethics, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 99 (1985).
66. Id. at 106-07.
67. Cohen, supra note 64, at 84.
68. See, e.g., Louis E. Newman, Introduction to REFORM JEWISH ETHICS & THE HALAKHAH:
AN EXPERIMENT INDECISION MAKING xiii (Eugene B. Borowitz ed., 1994).
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of oversimplifying our often complicated and sometimes contradictory
tradition, I will tentatively suggest two such principles.
One principle is equal justice under law. The Torah's command
"[ji]ustice, justice, shall you pursue" requires the creation of a just legal
system.69 While the Torah was not speaking of a political system like our
own, it does suggest attributes of justice that are applicable today. One
such principle is equal justice under law. Decisions should "not favor the
poor or show deference to the rich.''7 The "stranger who resides with
you shall be to you as one of your citizens." 7 Another such principle is
concern for the poor and powerless. Proverbs instructs judges to "[o]pen
thy mouth for the dumb"' and "plead the cause of the poor and
needy. ''"
These principles suggest that the conduct of the Jewish lawyer in
upholding the rule of law and in serving the poor could74 be quite consistent with professional ideals. What differentiates this perspective from the
simple equation of Jewish and professional values is that its foundation is
Jewish values which may overlap with professional values, but will not
necessarily do so.
So long as the Jewish lawyer seeks equal justice under law from a
religious perspective, she will reject the professional project but not equal
justice under law. As I have argued elsewhere, religious lawyering's
rejection of the professional project does not necessarily undermine rule of
law. Acceptance of personal identity rather than a professionally neutral
role suggests a different way to think about realizing the goal. Instead of
trying to "bleach out" difference, we should try to "create community"
by speaking frankly about how to realize a legal system which results in

69.
70.

Deuteronomy 16:20.
Leviticus 19:15.

71.

Leviticus 19:34. This notion is similar, but not identical, to our modern notions of equal

treatment under law. Rabbi Bernard J. Bamberger notes that the "alien had equal rights under the law
and also that he must refrain from the forbidden practices that would defile the land." PLAUT, supra
note 50, at 899. Leading rabbinic sources construed this provision to apply only to converts. See, e.g.,
THE METSUDAH CHUMASH/RASHt Vayikro 19:33-34 (Rabbi Avrohom Davis trans., 1994) (using the
word "proselyte" instead of "stranger" and including Rashi's commentary to the same effect). Rabbi
Bamberger, however, asserts that the term "stranger" included both the proselyte and "the unconverted
Gentile." PLAUT, supra note 50, at 899.
72. Proverbs 31:8 (Jewish Publication Society 1955). Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent
citations to Proverbs are to this version.

73.

Proverbs 31:9. This instruction reflects ageneral concern for protecting the poor and weak.

See, e.g., Leviticus 19:9-10 (requiring gleanings for the poor); Isaiah 1:15-17 (requiring assistance for

the wronged, the orphan, and the widow); Proverbs 14:31 (teaching that "[hie who oppresseth the poor
blasphemeth his Maker; But he that is gracious unto the needy honoureth Him.").
74. I use the word "could" because of the potential for alternative readings of authoritative
texts, see, e.g., supra note 71 and VIsoTZKy, supra note 59, as well as alternative constructions of
Judaism, see, e.g., supra note 59 and Pearce, supra note 8, at 1616 n.23.
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equal justice given our differences and our similarities.75 This indeed is
very much the task of the Jewish lawyer. As Buber teaches, "holiness is
true community with God and true community with human beings, both in
one. "76
Conclusion
After the Baal Shem reproached the Maggid of Mezeritch for reading
without soul, the Baal Shem began to read.' At that point, "[t]he room
filled with light [and] [t]he Maggid stood at Sinai again." '78 Through
understanding Judaism as a way of life, we may be able to answer the
"Jewish question" in a way that furthers both our legal system's commitment to equal justice and enhances the spirituality of our actions. While it
is far from clear how to fulfill these goals, our task begins with practicing
mitzvot, acting with kavannah, and79following the instruction of the eminent
sage Rabbi Hillel to go and study.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Pearce, supra note 8, at 1636.
BTBER, supra note 3, at 111.
BUBER, supra note 63, at 100.
WiEsEL, supra note 1, at 55.
VIsoTZKY, supra note 59, at 240.

